A Partial History 135th Infantry Regiment 34th Infantry Division Approved for Publication Allied Force Headquarters Information News and Censorship Section THE 135TH IN THE PRESENT WAR (p. 1-33) LANDING AT ORAN (p. 6) On 8 November 1942, the 2nd Battalion (less Company F and plus Company M) with attached communications and medical sections, was detached from the Regiment to form part of a Division advance party which left Camp Blessingbourne 8 December, traveling by motor to Fintona, North Ireland, and there entrained for Belfast. Ships were in on 8 December and the troops sailed to Liverpool, arriving on the following day. Other ships were boarded at Liverpool and the advance party set out for Africa, a voyage that included only a few days of very rough weather. Landing was made at Oran at 0900 hours on 21 December and after marching to an assembly area 18 miles from Oran the men proceeded by motor on 30 December to Relizane, Algeria, where the force underwent training until 5 January 1943. Units entrained at Relizane for Tlemcen, Algeria, arriving there shortly after midnight 7 January. The components of the force from the 135th Infantry were then sent by truck to a bivouac area northwest of Negrier, where the Regiment was assembled in its entirety on 11 January. The remainder of the Regiment left by train from Fintona, North Ireland, on 11 December 1942, embarked at Larne, North Ireland, on 12 December, and disembarked at Stranraer, Scotland, from which the units entrained for Crewe, England. On 23 December the Regiment left the stations by train and embarked from Liverpool on the HMS Orontes on the same day. The convoy entered the Straits of Gibralter on 1 January 1943, arriving at Mers-el-Kebir, Algeria, on 3 January. The first bivouac in North Africa was established near Assi-ben-Okba, Algeria, about fourteen miles from Oran. The units proceeded by truck to Ste. Barbe-du-Tletet on 9 January and entrained for Tlemcen, Algeria. By 11 January the Regiment was together again in the vicinity of Negrier where training was immediately initiated. PICHON - FIRST ACTION AGAINST THE GERMANS (pp. 6-7) On 2 February 1943, the 135th Combat Team with the 109th Quartermaster Battalion attached started its move east for Tunisia, North Africa. Bivouac was set up at night on the outskirts of Sidi-bel-Abbes, headquarters of the French Foreign Legion. On 3 February the night was spent outside Orleansville. Col. C. M. Parkin and Lt. Col. Carley L. Marshall were relieved of assignment to the Regiment of 4 February and Col. Robert W. Ward was assigned and assumed command. Bivouac that night was in the vicinity of L'Arba. Successive bivouacs were established in the vicinities of Bi-bou-Arrerdij, Guelma, and Le Kef. Danger of air raids halted day movement and the Regiment moved the night of 8-9 February to an area 10 miles east of Maktar, Tunisia. The 135th Infantry Combat Team was attached to the 1st Infantry Division and ordered to relieve elements of the French Army in the Pichon area to defend the sector against enemy attack, preventing the egress of the enemy in any westerly direction. Relief took place on successive nights, the 1st Battalion relieving the 3rd Battalion of the 1st RTA [(French) Regiment of Algerian Tirailleurs (Sharpshooters)] and the south half of the 3nd Battalion, 9th RTA, on 10-11 February; the 3rd Battalion relieving the 1st Battalion of the 1st RTA on 11-12 February; and the 2nd Battalion relieving the north half of the 2nd Battalion, 9th RTA, and the 1st Battalion, 9th RTA, on 12-13 February. The 125th Field Artillery Battalion relieved two batteries of French Artillery on 13-14 February. All remaining French Artillery and Anti-Tank protection, the British Royal Artillery Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Tank units were to remain in the area until further orders. Upon relief of the last French unit, responsibility for the sector was assumed by Col. Ward. In this sector the left flank of the Regiment was protected by French Irregulars and elements of the 1st Infantry Division; the right flank, however, was exposed to attack from the Fondouk Gap and Rhorab, both of which were in enemy hands. As of midnight, 14 February, the Regiment reverted to the control of the 34th Division The Regiment suffered its first casualties in this sector. PFC John J. Dresser, Company B, was wounded while on patrol 14 February. On 15 February, a five-man patrol from Company B failed to return. Early that evening during an air attack, Captain Charles A. Fanning and 2nd Lieutenant Charles B. Keys, both of Company C, were wounded, and PFC Erwin L. Nichols, Company C, and Technician Fifth Grade Herbert K. Schneider, Band, were killed by bomb fragments. On 14 February the enemy began a heavy attack against the 168th Infantry in the vicinity of Faid Pass and Sidi bou Zid. The attack started with Stuka dive bombing followed by tanks and infantry. The next day, [Major] General [Charles W.] Ryder, commanding the 34th Division, warned that the situation in the 168th sector did not look good and that the 135th should be prepared for anything from an attack to a withdrawal. By the 16th a successful breakthrough had been made by the enemy at Faid Pass and 50 to 60 tanks were reported moving northwest from Sudaguia at 1400. The Regiment was ordered to withdraw at 1900, 17 February, and at 1730 the enemy launched a small but fierce infantry attack supported by mortar and artillery fire. The attack was beaten off and the withdrawal started on schedule. Three Rifle Platoons, one each from Companies B, G, and I, supported by their light machine gun and mortar section, and Battery B, 125th Field Artillery Battalion, covered the withdrawal under command of Major Garnet E. Hall. The 1st Battalion withdrew into Division reserve in the vicinity of Sbiba by way of Maktar, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions withdrew to the vicinity of Er Rbeiba, and to Sbiba the next day where these two units were to take up defensive positions. Transportation was not available and the Regiment moved on foot a distance of 30 miles, closing in on the new area at 2300, 18 February. General Ryder, who met the last units as they were coming in, warned that regardless of how tired the men were, the defensive positions must be taken up immediately as the situation was very grave. THE DEFENSE OF SBIBA VALLEY (pp. 7-8) The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were dug in on the high ground on the Division left flank and by noon of the 19th tanks of the enemy had broken through at Sbeitl and were attacking a British Guards Brigade on the Division right flank. These tank and small infantry attacks were continued for the next four days. Most of the fighting was done in the valley, and the brunt of the attacks were borne by the British Guards and the 18th [1st Infantry Division] and 133rd Combat Teams. All attacks were repelled and easily broken up at long range by artillery fire before they reached the main line of resistance. In a few cases the enemy infiltrated through the lines but they were captured or killed. These attacks were not so heavy, but were diversionary efforts to contain our forces in the Sbiba valley so that reinforcements could not be sent to the Kasserine sector where an "all-out" enemy attack had started on the morning of 20 February, broken through the pass at Kasserine, and progressed successfully toward Tebessa and Thala. The situation at Thala became very serious and on the night of 22-23 February the Regiment was again ordered to withdraw to the vicinity of Rohia to conform with the line in the Thala sector. During this time, the 1st Battalion reverted to Regimental control, and the 2nd Battalion went into Division reserve. Mine fields were laid and all positions were wired. There were no further attacks made by the enemy in this sector, and the information from various sources indicated that the enemy was withdrawing in all sectors on this front on the 24th. On the 25th 2nd Battalion plus other Division troops were sent out on a reconnaissance in force, known as "Wulf Force". They were divided into three groups. The southern group under the command of Lt. Col Clarence J. Lee went south through Sbiba and on to Sbeitla; Company C was part of this force. Company F plus a Platoon of the 34th Reconnaissance Troop , with Capt. Frank A. Mccullough in command, went through Kef el Ahmar Pass. Company G was part of Lt. Col. Lee's group[?]. As a result of this reconnaissance, the Division moved forward on the night of 26 February to the original line near Sbiba where a new defensive position was taken up, mine fields laid, and all positions wired. The defenses in the vicinity of Rohia were also improved and made ready for a secondary position. THE EL ALA - PICHON DIVERSION (p. 8) Orders were received 4 March to proceed to the vicinity of Pichon by way of El Ala with the mission of conducting a show of force to divert reinforcements from the northern sectors. The following units were place under the command of Col. Ward to conduct the operation: 3rd Battalion, 135th; 125th Field Artillery with one platoon of 107th Coast Artillery (Anti-Aircraft) attached; one company, 751st Tank Battalion; one platoon, 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion; and 34th Reconnaissance Troop with four pioneer and demolition squads, 109th Engineers, attached. All units plus the 751st Tank company were ordered to proceed to the vicinity of Er Rbeiba, closing in this area at 0400, 5 March, and continuing the advance at 0430 hours. At 1150 hours contact was gained by patrols operating in cactus west of El Ala. These patrols were driven off by rifle fire, allowing the force to continue unmolested. Companies I and K, accompanied by elements of the 34th Reconnaissance, advanced west from El Ala astride the secondary east-west El Ala - Pichon road, and at 1530 hours had advanced to the designated positions and had come under heavy rifle, machine-gun, and mortar fire. At 1400 hours the 125th Field Artillery moved into position and came under heavy direct fire from enemy tanks. Counter-battery [fire] drove the tanks out. Information came from General Ryder at 1600 hours that enemy tanks and motorized infantry were detrucking near the left rear of the force. At the same time enemy tanks were reported advancing north from Hadjeb el Aieun toward the right rear. At 1700 hours orders were received to retire to the high ground five miles west of El Ala, but reconsideration called for retirement to the original lines. An assault had been started by Company I and the enemy was discovered wearing U. S. field jackets and other clothing. The order for withdrawal directed the tank company and the 813th Tank Destroyer platoon to take up a position in the rear to meet any enemy threats. The reconnaissance troop was disposed along the river five kilometers west and two kilometers north of El Ala, and four platoons of the 135th remained in position to cover the withdrawal. Battery B of the 125th kept up harassing fire to cover the withdrawal which was greatly hampered by rain and inky blackness plus "ice slick" mud roads. The command group made a wrong turn in the darkness, and in order for them to get back on the route of withdrawal it was necessary to pass through the enemy lines near El Ala. They drew no fire. A missing officer who reported two days later saw strong German and Italian units north, south, and west of El Ala. All units closed in the area of El Rbeiba by dawn and proceeded west to the original positions. THE FIRST FONDOUK (pp. 8-9) The 135th Combat Team moved through Kef el Ahmar Pass and reached Hadjeb el Aioun at 0300, 27 March, and at 0600 advanced in conjunction with the 168th Infantry along the axis Hadjeb el Aioun - Fondouk el Okbi. This axis was the boundary between Regiments [with] the 135th on the left (north). The 3rd Battalion was in assault with the 2nd Battalion echeloned in depth to the left and rear; the 1st Battalion in Division reserve near the assembly area. Movement progressed rapidly. Some artillery fire was received by the 2nd Battalion from Djebel Trozza, and between 1116 and 1323 hours the 168th on the right received mortar and artillery fire which held them up. The 3rd Battalion which had continued to advance was ordered to hold up until the 168th could come abreast. At 1130 hours the left flank of the 2nd Battalion was attacked by a small force of Germans in scout cars and two tanks moving up from the rear. The Third and Fourth Platoons of Company F held the attack until artillery fire broke it up. At 1347 the commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion reported that one or two artillery pieces were enfilading his lines, and from then on enemy fire became general with the result that our forward movement was checked. Col. Ward issued orders for a night attack by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions and the troops went forward to encounter intense hostile fire and suffered heavy casualties. Units intermingled and control and contact with the 168th was lost. The Battalions withdrew. The 2nd Battalion attacked at 0700 hours on 28 March after a 10-minute concentration by the entire Division Artillery. But the leading elements again ran into intense enfiladed and frontal fire and were forced to dig in. Infiltration was attempted without success and on 29 March the 168th attacked following a heavy artillery barrage. The 2nd Battalion again attempted to penetrate enemy defenses during this diversion but was unsuccessful. The positions were held until the night of 1-2 April when the combat team retired two miles to the west on Division order. THE SECOND FONDOUK (p. 9) The 135th Combat Team moved from two miles west of Fondouk to a position west of Fondouk Gap on 7 April and at 0500 hours, in conjunction with the 133rd Infantry launched the second attack directed at the high ground just south of Fondouk Gap. The Regiment attacked in column of battalions with the 3rd in assault and the 1st in reserve, and at 0630 hours the 3rd signalled for the prearranged artillery barrage. A number of shells fell short, causing casualties in Company K, but the attack pressed on. At 0730 hours the advance was halted for a scheduled bombing mission but it failed to arrive and the troops renewed the advance behind artillery at 0930 hours. Progress was very slow and by 1140 forward movement had ceased. Artillery kept up harassing fire on enemy positions and an assault by the Regiment at 1545 hours failed because of intense enemy fire from Rhorab in the left rear. Tanks from the 751st Tank Battalion supported another assault by Companies K and L, leading but this also failed. At 1900 hours the 2nd and 3rd Battalions launched a night attack but it was unsuccessful. The 1st Battalion passed through the 3rd Battalion on the morning of 8 April and at 1015 hours, tanks from the 751st supporting, another assault was made on the objective. The tanks reached the objective but the infantry was unable to make it and the armor was forced to withdraw after 15 minutes. No further progress was made that day. At 1547 hours the 1st Battalion was dive-bombed and suffered a number of casualties. The British 6th Armoured Division was able to push their reconnaissance units through the gap at Fondouk and at 1600 hours a tank battle was reported in progress. The 1st and 2nd Battalions launched another attack at 0500 hours, 10 April, and at 0622 reached the first objective, reorganized, and pushed on to the second objective. The 168th Infantry relieved the 135th at noon; the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved near Pichon and the 3rd Battalion took up a defensive position near Rhorab. On 15 April the Regiment moved to an area seven miles east of Maktar where intensive training with emphasis on night attacks continued to 25 April when movement was made to an area twelve miles east of Beja.