A Partial History
135th Infantry Regiment

34th Infantry Division

Approved for Publication
Allied Force Headquarters
Information News and Censorship Section

THE 135TH IN THE PRESENT WAR (p. 1-33)

ITALY AND THE CROSSINGS OF THE VOLTURNO (pp. 12-17)

	Prior to leaving for the Italian campaign the Regiment underwent a
period of two weeks' training at the Fifth Army Invasion Center followed
by two weeks at the Fifth Army Leadership and Battle Training Center in
the Slissen area.  A new unit was added to the Regiment, the Cannon
Company (eight 75mm pack howitzers) commanded by Captain Paul W. Blommen
of the 125th Field Artillery [Battalion], who brought with him a cadre
from that organization augmented by volunteers from the Regiment and
replacements from the United States.  At the end of the training period
the Regiment moved to an assembly area between Bou Sfer and Ain el
Turck, and the loading of vehicles and equipment started on 9 September
1943 at Mers el Kebir.

	On 15 September personnel and unit baggage were loaded aboard three
British ships, the Arando, the Empire Trooper, and the Durbin Castle,
and sailed on that day.  There were no incidents of importance enroute,
although in the freighter convoy which went by way of Malta and the
Straits of Messina, the William P. Gerhardt was torpedoed and sunk.  On
20 September the convoy passed the coast of Sicily, and dropped anchor
in the Gulf of Salerno northeast of Paestum on the 21st.  The landing
was made across the beach in LCIs, LCTs, and DUKWs from the transports. 
After an eight-mile hot dusty road march inland, the Regiment went into
an assembly area and the next four days were utilized for the unloading
and assembling of vehicles and equipment.

	On the 28 and 30 [September] the Regiment with the exception of the
1st Battalion and Cannon Company moved to an assembly area near
Montemarano via the route
Battipaglia-Eboli-Calibritto-Lioni-Montemarano, and on 1 October the 2nd
Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion, 133rd Infantry, in the vicinity of
Pratola.  The balance of the Regiment bivouaced in the area of
Montefusco, and on the same day the 1st Battalion arrived at Piazza. 
German documents picked up in the area of the CP, oddly enough,
indicated that the German 135th Flak Regiment had occupied the area
shortly before our arrival.  Documents recorded the Italian and Sicilian
losses, Hitler's instructions for handling former Italian soldiers,
"kills" of American planes in Sicily and Italy, and the naming of our
A-36s "Jabos".

	The 2nd Battalion was directed to hold its position and send
security patrols west of the Sabato River.  The Regiment was assigned
the mission of patrolling to the northwest.  On 3 October the 2nd
Battalion, after receiving artillery fire and light small-arms fire in
the Pratola area moved on and secured a crossing of the river.  A number
of civilians were killed by the shelling, although we suffered no
losses, and wounded civilians were cared for by 2nd Battalion Medics. 
The 2nd Battalion made contact with the 3rd [Infantry] Division on the
left and moved forward to Tufo where it was relieved by elements of the
3rd Division.

	On 4 October General Ryder assembled the Regimental and Battalion
commanding and executive officers for a discussion of tactics employed
by the Germans in this delaying action and possible counter-measures
that could be taken.  On 5 October the 2nd Battalion moved to the
vicinity of Altavilla preparatory to moving the Regiment in south of
Montesarchio.  On 7 October the 2nd Battalion had closed in the
Montesarchio area, and the Regiment march from Montefusco to Altavilla
where it was shuttled to a bivouac south of Montesarchio.  The Regiment
was ordered to relieve the 30th Infantry [Regiment, 3rd Infantry
Division] in the vicinity of Monte della Corte and the 2nd Battalion,
meeting some artillery and mortar fire, effected the relief without
difficulty shortly after midnight.  The 1st Battalion, hampered by bad
roads, rain, and black night, did not complete its relief until
daylight, and the positions occupied could not be readjusted until
darkness.  On 9 October the 2nd Battalion reconnoitered positions in the
vicinity of Limatola preparatory to sending one company to relieve
elements of the 15th Infantry [Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division].  They
were directed to hold the Limatola area until passed through by the
168th Infantry.  Both the 2nd and 1st Battalions were given the mission
of reconnoitering the Volturno and Calere Rivers at their junction for
possible night crossings.  The 3rd Battalion march to the vicinity of
Frazzo.

	The next three days were spent in night patrolling of both sides of
the river and denying the Germans observation from Solopaca.  Wire
communication during this period was difficult to maintain, and
intermittent shelling of the Dugenta-Amorosi road, and the positions the
Battalions occupied, limited the supply of the Battalions by vehicles to
three or four 1/4-tons each night.  A direct hit on one 1/4-ton killed
two and injured three men.  Most of the fire apparently came from tanks
and self-propelled guns in the vicinity of Amorosi.  After our artillery
got into position the enemy shelling was less intense.  The 2nd
Battalion had several night encounters with enemy patrols.  Our patrols
were successful in selecting three points as suitable river crossings. 
One was a former ferry crossing and another an old dam that seemed
strong enough to take a few vehicles.

	The Fifth Army plan for the crossing of the Volturno River was for
VI Corps on the right to seize the high ground north of the river, thus
taking the pressure off X Corps so that it could cross the river and
canal north of it.  The plan of VI was that the 3rd Division on the left
and the 34th Division in the center would cross the river and drive
north, while the 45th [Infantry] Division on the right, from a position
north of the Calore River, was to drive west through Telese and S.
Salvatore to the Volturno River.  The crossing was to be made
simultaneously by all elements of the Fifth Army on the night of 12-13
October.  The 34th Division, with the 168th Infantry in reserve,
supported by eight battalions of artillery, was to cross between a point
one and one-half miles northwest of Limatola and the junction of the
Volturno-Calore Rivers, and secure a bridgehead north of Limatola.  The
Regiment was to cross the river with the 1st Battalion and Company E
leading the assault with the objective the high ground northeast of
Squille (Hill 111) and Hill 131.  The 2nd Battalion was to pass through
or around the 1st Battalion and secure the objective Hill 283.  The 1st
Battalion's second objective was Hill 282 with the mission of relieving
pressure on the 168th Infantry on our left and lending every possible
assistance to its advance.  Steep, muddy river banks would necessitate
the use of ropes and improvised rafts until a bridgehead could be
secured for bridge construction by the [109th] Engineers.  The 3rd
Battalion was in reserve.

	The attack jumped off at 0200 hours on the night of 12-13 October
and Company E, led by 1st Lt. Joe H. Kimble, effected the crossing and
sent the first prisoners back.  The first German was personally captured
by Lt. Kimble who directed the security of the bridgehead so that the
balance of the Company might cross.  There was intense machine-gun fire
but Lt. Kimble's personal direction and inspiration of each platoon
spurred the mission on to success.  His leadership, making possible the
crossing of the Battalion, brought the award of the Distinguished
Service Cross.

	Another act of extraordinary heroism was performed by 2nd Lt. Vernon
C. Harris of the same Company who lost his life.  Lt. Harris was the
platoon leader of the leading element and, although the barrage of the
friendly artillery fire had not lifted, he plunged across the river at
the head of his men in the face of enemy artillery, mortar, and
machine-gun fire and gained the other side.  Lt. Harris was mortally
wounded by shrapnel and, while suffering great pain, he directed his
platoon in organizing the ground and shot flares into the air to mark
his position.  When Lt. Kimble came to him, the dying Lieutenant pointed
out several enemy machine gun positions.  He was also awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross.

	Another 2nd Lt., William O. Sporbert, of Company A, led his platoon
in placing a guide rope across the swift-flowing, treacherous river,
enabling the rest of the [1st] Battalion to cross.  After reaching the
far side, Lt. Sporbert ran into a mine and was thrown into the river. 
Rescued and given first aid, he set out to join his platoon and while
enroute he entered a minefield to aid a wounded man.  In doing so he was
seriously injured by a concussion mine.  The Distinguished Service Cross
was awarded Lt. Sporbert.

	By 0600 Company B had reached its first phase line across the river.
The balance of the 2nd Battalion crossed the river and after
neutralizing enemy positions that had been bypassed north of Squille,
the Battalion was reorganized and prepared to go forward to the next
objective. That morning at 0400 the 1st Battalion took their objective,
Hill 283, and elements of the 766th Tank Destroyer Battalion moved four
guns to the top of the hill, and with selected hull-down positions, they
could fire over the hill.  There were several threatened counter-attacks
on the positions of the assault Battalions, but none of serious
proportions developed.

	The 2nd Battalion went to the ridge above Ruviano and sent patrols
into the outskirts of the village without contact on the night of 14
October, but on the 15th combat patrols on the north side of the town
met with stiff resistance.  Low-flying enemy planes swept over our
positions and dropped their bomb load north of Amorosi.  By 1730 two
companies of the 2nd Battalion moved up the ridges after serious
engagement with enemy patrols and snipers on the outskirts of the town. 
One patrol was led into a machine gun trap by an Italian civilian.  The
3rd Battalion moved up behind the 2nd with the mission of protecting the
right flank, and the 1st Battalion went into an assembly area north of
the town where it received considerable artillery shelling throughout
the night.  In the meantime, the Anti-Tank Company Mine Platoon and the
Engineers had worked up along the road on the west bank of the Volturno
and 1/4-ton truck trails were broken forward from here, past the blown
bridge by-passes, to get ammunition and water under cover of darkness. 
The 2nd Battalion achieved complete tactical surprise in the operation
by maneuvering the Battalion into striking position behind its patrols
before the Germans were aware of its presence.  Prior to the opening of
the road, supplies were ferried across the Volturno by an improvised
man-operated rubber float.  The selected bridge crossing was delayed by
intense artillery shelling and dive-bombing on 13-14 [October] and one
selected site had to be abandoned.

	By morning of 17 October the 3rd Battalion had contacted patrols of
the 168th Infantry on the left in the vicinity of Alvignano.  The 2nd
Battalion immediately started patrolling to determine the likely spots
for the second crossing of the Volturno., and on the evening of 18
October one battalion of the 133rd Infantry moved into our sector and
pushed across the river taking a position near the blown bridge.  It was
first ordered that we were to secure a bridgehead with one battalion,
backing it up with another battalion, but this was cancelled when enemy
tanks and armored vehicles were seen moving, possibly for a
counter-attack, in Dragoni.  A good crossing was located with a hard
bottom where vehicles could cross and on the morning of 19 October the
3rd and 1st Battalions secured a bridgehead with the 1st Battalion going
into position on the left of the road running to Alife, and the 3rd on
the right followed by the 2nd Battalion.  The ground was low and swampy,
cut with deep, swift canals perpendicular to the route of advance.  The
attached company of the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion was confined to
the road and by daylight had by-passed several blown bridges.  The
mission of the 3rd Battalion was to go around to the right of Alife, and
the 1st Battalion was to skirt the left south edge on the town.  The 2nd
Battalion took up positions to protect the right flank of the Regiment. 
In this flat ground south of the town The 1st Battalion encountered the
German rocket gun [Nebelwerfer?] for the first time.

	Progress was made at a slow but steady pace and at noon, 21 October,
14 enemy tanks were reported to have slipped in on our left flank on the
north side of the river.  The 125th Field Artillery did some excellent
shooting and the Cub OP [aerial observation post (plane)] reported five
tanks out of action with direct hits on two.  During the night the
Germans were able to work in and salvage them.  Heavy shelling came in
all day over the entire area.  On 22 October the 133rd Infantry moved
forward on our left flank to positions northwest of Alife., and the 2nd
Battalion patrolled the river to protect the left flank of the 133rd and
maintain contact with the 3rd Division across the river.

	On 25 October a reconnaissance was made of the area west of S.
Angelo and a plan was developed for the 2nd Battalion of the 133rd
Infantry [the 100th Infantry Battalion (Nisei)] to secure the road
running southwest of Ailano.  The 3rd Battalion on the right was to pass
through the 1st Battalion of the 133rd keeping in the mountains to the
northwest and secure the objective, Hill 559.  The 1st Battalion was
brought up in the rear of the 3rd Battalion and prepared to pass through
or around, and secure the 3rd Battalion objective.  There had been no
opportunity for a physical ground reconnaissance forward of the 133rd
Infantry positions.  The attack jumped off at 0530 hours,26 October, and
the 3rd Battalion progressed slowly over the difficult wooded mountains.
The 2nd Battalion was caught in the open when the fog lifted.  One
company was able to work its way around to the north end of Hill 325 and
the balance of the Battalion was pinned down all day by enemy fire from
the wooded hills in front.  By 0830 hours of the same day the 3rd
Battalion was on line south of Hill 559.  The 2nd Battalion endeavored
to move one platoon around the left flank but it was repulsed and badly
shot up.  During this engagement Company A of the 2nd Chemical Warfare
Battalion was attached to the 2nd Battalion and was effectively employed
in shelling Hill 325 with high explosive.  At 1500 hours the 3rd
Battalion occupied Hill 559 and pushed on toward Hill 432 north of it. 
Just as darkness was falling, the 125th Field Artillery did some good
shooting on the road running southwest from Ailano and two large fires
started in what appeared to be enemy ammunition trains.

	The night of 27 October Company A of the 191st Tank Battalion had
come up behind the 2nd Battalion with the plan of moving around the
right flank and the north end of Hill 235.  The attack at 0530 hours on
that morning toward the objective southwest of Ailano was preceded by an
artillery concentration which lifted and advanced 100 yards every six
minutes.  The tanks were to precede the infantry driving to the
southwest of Ailano.  That day the 2nd Battalion was again kept from
advancing by artillery fire and intense small-arms fire from Hill 235. 
In this action 2nd Lt. Howard R. Lieurance of Company E was mortally
wounded.  His platoon position was under fire from enemy machine guns
150 yards away and also under a barrage of artillery and mortar fire. 
Lt. Lieurance called his squad leaders and gave instructions for the
attack before he became unconscious.  A posthumous award of the
Distinguished Service Cross was made to the heroic officer.

	The 2nd Battalion was set for another attack at 1500 hours when
three enemy tanks were observed from the Regimental CP on the left
flank.  Shortly thereafter nine other tanks appeared coming from the
southwest into the Battalion position.  Our artillery and tanks engaged
them, scoring three direct hits and stopped the movement of the German
armor..  Our tanks had been unable to cross the terrain and get into
position to lead the attack.

	Enemy tanks came within 100 yards of the leading elements of the 1st
Battalion which made [for] very close shooting for the artillery. 
However, the troops were able to withstand the shelling and at nightfall
reorganized.  During the day the 1st Battalion attempted to work through
and around the north flank of the 3rd Battalion to cut the north-south
road in the vicinity of Pratella.  Strongly held machine gun positions
in the rough terrain prevented this, and at dark the 1st Battalion
consolidated their position on Hill 559 and the 3rd Battalion [did
likewise] on the high ground northeast of Ailano.

	Three of the tanks of Company A, 191st Tank Battalion, in support of
the 2nd Battalion, were disabled; one turned over, one hit a mine, and
one was struck by enemy shell fire.  Failure of radio communication
complicated the liaison between the Tank Battalion and the Regiment.

	By nightfall the determined opposition for Hill 235 was fully
appreciated.  The plan for 28 October was that the 168th Infantry would
come in behind the 2nd Battalion, jump off at 0900 hours with one
battalion and drive to the southwest across Hill 235.  The 2nd Battalion
was to assist with the fire of all its weapons.  After Hill 235 had
fallen another battalion of the 168th Infantry was to drive for the road
net and ridge.  The 3rd Battalion, 135th, was to come out of the hills
and clean out the town of Ailano, assist by fire the advance of the
north battalion of the 168th Infantry, reassemble north of the town, and
drive for the high ground west of Pratella.  The 1st Battalion was to
hold in position on Hill 559 and protect the right flank of the
Regiment.  When the fire of the 2nd Battalion was masked by the 168th
Infantry, it was to assemble west of Raviscania and be in position on
Hill 605 by daylight.  The attack of the 168th Infantry was to be
preceded by a 30-minute artillery preparation which was to include the
town of Ailano.

	At first light the 2nd Battalion advised that patrols during the
night had not encountered any enemy and that small "feeler" groups had
moved around rather freely since dawn and had drawn no fire.  It was
their opinion that the Germans had evacuated the positions during the
night and this was substantiated by reports from prisoners.  At the
scheduled time, however, the artillery preparation came down.  A cease
firing order went out and the 168th Infantry proceeded to its objective
without opposition and the 2nd Battalion pulled back into the assembly
area.  The 3rd Battalion had the objective limited to Hill 325, and had
two reinforced companies on the Hill by 1845 hours.  They encountered
intermittent artillery fire but no small arms.  During the morning our
[Air Force] bombed Pratella and the road leading out of it to the
northwest.  During the night of 28-29 October elements of the 504th
Parachute [infantry] Regiment [82nd Airborne Division] passed through
our positions on the Ailano-Valle road and on the same night the
engineers opened up a peep trail from Raviscania to Ailano which allowed
seven peeps to get through to supply the Battalions.  After 0200 hours
the 29 October the main Pratella road was opened for heavier vehicles,
and the 2nd Battalion was ordered to protect the right flank and block
the road from Valle to Ailano.  The 1st Battalion was to move to the
shale nose of Hill 432 and support by fire if necessary the advance of
the 3rd Battalion on Hill 320.  The 3rd Battalion was to move west from
Hill 325, clear the town of Pratella, and drive northeast to secure the
nose of Hill 320.  Patrols from the 1st Battalion found Pratella
unoccupied by the enemy.  The 3rd Battalion moved through Pratella and
on to the objective.  They ran into scattered machine gun nests at dark,
which they neutralized with mortars and patrols.

	For the preceding two days the Battalions in the hills had
encountered many booby traps and mines, with casualties resulting.  The
Regimental Adjutant, Captain Emory J. Trawick, sustained injuries from a
booby trap and died 30 October.

	On the morning of the 30 [October] the 3rd Battalion, 133rd
Infantry, moved forward to relieve our 3rd Battalion.  The relief,
however, was not effected until late in the day because of enemy
artillery fire.  The night of 30-31 October the 2nd Battalion moved two
companies to the high ground east of Prata, and the road now was secure
from small-arms fire for the passage of the 168th Infantry through us on
the right of the Prata-Capriati road and the 133rd Infantry on the left.
The 1st Battalion guided the 168th Infantry through the Prata area and
on 31 October the Battalion was pulled back to an assembly area near
Hills 325 and 559.

	During the entire operation most of the supply was carried by hand
at night, varying from 1,000 yards to four miles, and most of it through
mountainous terrain.  Many times it was possible to feed only one meal
in 24 hours and that at night.  Round trips for food and water took as
long as 11 hours.  Maps of the area were very difficult to read,
especially in the mountainous country.  Valuable information was
obtained from prisoners, some of whom gave sketches of enemy positions,
and information from escaped British prisoners who had been captured at
Tobruk was of considerable help.  Disease, as well as the enemy, had
been taking a toll from the Regiment, and during this phase of the
Volturno crossings 392 officers and men were evacuated because of
illness.  There were many cases of jaundice and malaria.

	The Regiment remained in the area northeast Ailano for two days
while the advance of the 133rd and 168th progressed through Capriati. 
The men received pay for the last two months, and having their blankets
for the first time since 12 October gave some much needed rest.  For the
first time since that date the Regiment was out of light artillery
range.  Enemy activity was limited to a few reconnaissance planes and
the bombing of artillery positions in the rear.

	On 3 November the Regiment was on the move again, marching for nine
miles to the vicinity of Fontegreca as the first step toward the third
crossing of the Volturno River.  The next day bombs fell in the vicinity
of the 3rd Battalion area.  The Anti-Tank Company cleared a number of
S-mines from their area and it was noted that the location of enemy
mines seemed to be marked by felling a small tree in the direction of
the fields.  The 3rd Battalion was ordered to relieve the 1st Battalion,
168th, in the vicinity of Ravi della Cappelle, and the relief was
completed at 1845 hours.  The following day, 5 November, the 3rd
Battalion was ordered to patrol the east bank of the Volturno to the
north to determine enemy positions and installations and to clear out
any pockets of resistance.  One gun position was located and a 10-man
patrol of Germans was observed moving northeast toward Macchia.  The
area in the rear of the Regimental CP was again bombed causing some
casualties in the supporting artillery.  During daylight of 5 November
the 1st Battalion began the Regiment's third crossing of the Volturno
under intermittent artillery fire just south of Roccaravindola.  That
night the 2nd Battalion closed in an assembly area south of S. Maria
Oliveto and received some enemy small-arms and mortar fire.  The
following morning the 3rd Battalion crossed the river and reached the
flat ground just east of Roccaravindola at 0315 hours 6 [November].

	On the previous day Lt. Paul F. Lawson and a squad of the
Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon searched the body of a German
battalion commander, killed the night before, his driver, motorcycle,
and side-car, and obtained an overlay showing the current German
defensive positions in the sector.  The information influenced the
entire subsequent Corps' plan.

	The Cannon Company succeeded in getting one platoon across the
river, but small-arms, mortar, and artillery fire prevented their going
into position immediately.  The Anti-Tank Mine Platoon removed 60
S-mines surrounding the building which had been taken over by the
Regimental CP after crossing the river.  Both the 1st and 2nd Battalions
suffered a number of casualties from personnel mines.  Enemy aircraft
were active over the area on 6 November but did not bomb or strafe our
troops.  Artillery fire was intense and the 2nd Battalion was subjected
to small-arms fire in the vicinity of S. Maria Oliveto, which had not
been cleared.  The Germans seemed to have done an excellent job of
mining the entire area.  All likely bivouac areas were covered and
avenues of approach were heavily mined and the canalized avenues of
approach to the enemy were effectively interdicted by artillery and
mortar fire.